REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
This report provides information on the status and development of the nuclear power programme in Lithuania, including factors related to the planning, decision making and implementation of the nuclear power programme that together lead to safe decommissioning of nuclear power plants as well as spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management.
The CNPP summarizes organizational and industrial aspects of nuclear power programmes and provides information about the relevant legislative, regulatory and international framework in Lithuania.
Lithuania has two nuclear power reactors under decommissioning and a number of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management facilities under construction or in operation. The potential development of a new nuclear power plant, namely the Visaginas NPP project, has been cancelled.
1. COUNTRY ENERGY OVERVIEW
1.1. ENERGY INFORMATION
1.1.1. Energy policy
In order to reduce Lithuania’s dependence on energy supplies from a single source, a number of energy projects have been implemented in recent years. Only a few years ago, Lithuania had no alternative gas supply or electricity interconnectivity with European Union countries, except limited interconnections with Latvia. The liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Klaipeda was completed at the end of 2014, while at the end of 2015, the electricity interconnections between Sweden and Lithuania (NordBalt) and between Poland and Lithuania (LitPol Link) became operational.
Since 31 December 2009, owing to the permanent shutdown of the state owned Ignalina nuclear power plant (NPP), Lithuania’s electricity generation structure changed significantly, and Lithuania changed from being a net exporter of electricity to a net importer of electricity.
The energy sector is particularly important to the Lithuanian economy and energy security is a strategic priority for the Government. It is being ensured by breaking Lithuania’s energy isolation by establishing alternative ways to import energy resources and by seeking to secure sufficient and competitive internal capacities of energy production.
The shutdown of Ignalina NPP at the end of 2009 required a clear strategy regarding replacement of the capacity generated by Ignalina NPP by other electricity generation capacities.
In June 2010, the Government approved the National Renewable Energy Sources Development Strategy, which aims to achieve at least a 30-45% share in the gross final energy consumption to be produced from renewables by 2030 and 80% by 2050. The biggest potential is foreseen in wind energy, hydropower and biomass (mostly for heat production).
On 21 June 2018, the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania (Seimas) approved the revised National Energy Independence Strategy. The Strategy of 2018 provides four main directions for Lithuanian energy policy — energy security, the development of green energy, efficient energy consumption, competitiveness and innovation. Importantly, the strategy does not foresee development of nuclear power in Lithuania.
Lithuania has taken steps to liberalize its electricity market and to ensure a consumer’s right to choose his or her electricity supplier and to purchase electricity for a real market price. Lithuania’s regulated tariffs benefit only household consumers, but these tariffs are planned to be abolished by 2020. On 1 January 2010, the electricity market was officially started in Lithuania (the first among the Baltic States) — a crucial step towards the common Baltic electricity market. A restatement of the Law on Electricity, which entered into force in February 2012, created legal preconditions for the integration of Lithuania’s electricity market into the Nordic market. This integration has led to the launch of a bidding area (which is a network area in which market participants in energy trading submit their bids) in June 2012 in Lithuania by Nord Pool Spot AS, Europe’s leading Nordic power exchange. The Nord Pool Spot intraday market (ELBAS) in Lithuania was launched in 2013. This completed the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) long term goal of creating a modern and integrated Baltic power market connected to the Nordic region.
1.1.2. Estimated available energy
Primary energy resources, in particular fossil fuels, in Lithuania are rather scarce. In order to meet energy requirements, local oil, peat, wood, geothermal, wind, solar and hydropower, as well as energy from chemical processes could be used. In 2018, the share of these local energy sources in the country’s primary energy balance was 24.5%. Since 2001, renewable energy sources have played a more important role. In 2018, the share of renewables in the balance of indigenous energy resources was 81.76%. Currently, the main renewable energy resource is biomass (including wood waste, boughs, wood chips, pellets, sawdust and waste from agriculture). The contribution of hydropower in absolute value fluctuates depending on climatic conditions, with small changes. The contribution of biofuels, used as a motor fuel for road transport, as well as that of wind energy is increasing.
Over the past few years, support for renewable energy has grown continuously both at the national and European levels. Therefore, in 2018, renewable energy sources accounted for 25.3% of gross final energy consumption and 16.8% of gross electricity consumption in Lithuania, with wind, hydropower and biomass being the largest contributors. At the end of 2018, wind power was the biggest single technology, accounting for 65.2% of installed capacity, while hydropower and solar are the other major sources of renewable power, accounting for 14.3% and 10.0%, respectively, in the current mix of renewable electricity generation capacity.
In 2018, renewable energy sources accounted for 25.26% of gross final energy consumption and 18.41% of gross electricity consumption in Lithuania, with wind, hydropower and biomass being the largest contributors. Table 1 shows estimated available energy by source.
TABLE 1. ESTIMATED AVAILABLE ENERGY SOURCES
|Estimated available energy sources|
|Total amount in specific units*||15||64||N.A.||N.A.||141||840||100||390|
|Total amount in exajoules (EJ)||N.A.||N.A.||N.A.||N.A.||N.A.||N.A.||N.A.||N.A.|
*Solid, liquid: million tonnes; gas: billion m3; uranium: metric tonnes; hydro, renewable: MW.
N.A. – not applicable
1.1.3. Energy statistics
The development of the total primary energy consumption in petajoule (PJ) is shown in Table 2. Oil and oil products were the most important fuels in Lithuania for several decades. However, since 1990, its share in the primary energy balance fluctuated in a comparatively large range with a reduced role owing to decreasing consumption of heavy fuel oil to produce electricity and district heat. After the closure of the Ignalina NPP, the share of oil products increased to 39.5% in 2018. At present, natural gas is one of the most important fuels in Lithuania. In 2018, its share in the Lithuanian primary energy balance was 23.0%.
During the period 1990–2009, the share of nuclear — the cheapest imported fuel — was high. The role of nuclear is critical because it is comparatively cheap, and nuclear fuel helped to relieve certain burdens related to balance of payments. Nuclear fuel also increased the security of the primary energy supply, especially in the power sector. The share of nuclear energy in the primary energy balance in the year 2009 (year of final closure of the NPP) was 29.6%. Until 2009, Lithuania was a net electricity exporter. Over the period 2010–2018 (owing to the closure of the main electricity generation source), more than 50% of the electricity required to meet the country’s gross electricity demand was imported from neighbouring countries; in 2018, the share of electricity import in the primary energy balance was equal to 10.7%.
Final electricity consumption and demand decreased from 12 TW?h in 1990 to 6.2 TW?h in 2000 but increased by 4.8% per annum during the period 2000–2008. Electricity consumption increased in all sectors of the national economy. In 2009, owing to economic recession, the total final electricity demand decreased by 7.4%. Over the period 2009–2018, final electricity demand increased on average by 2.4% per year.
TABLE 2. ENERGY STATISTICS
|- Other RES||13.6||11.9||27.0||35.3||42.7||58.1||63.2||63.1||4.8|
|- Other sources||N.A.||3.6||5.5||7.0||8.8||9.6||11.8||11.3||4.1|
|- Other RES||13.6||11.9||27.3||36.1||47.8||60.2||67.2||65.4||5.0|
|- Other sources||N.A.||3.6||5.5||7.0||8.8||9.6||11.8||11.3||4.1|
|Net import (Import-Export)||483.7||471.8||161.9||202.5||231.1||230.0||236.0||240.7||2.2|
* Latest available data.
** Energy consumption = Primary energy consumption + Net import (Import–Export) of secondary energy.
*** Solid fuels include coal, lignite, peat and non-renewable waste.
—: Data not available.
Note: RES: Renewal energy sources. Other sources include energy from chemical processes.
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
1.2. THE ELECTRICITY SYSTEM
1.2.1. Electricity policy and decision making process
In January 2009, the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania was reestablished for the purpose of reforming the Lithuanian energy sector. Since then, a number of reforms have been undertaken in the energy sector.
In 2009, the European Union adopted the Third Energy Package, a package of legislative measures aimed at liberalizing European Union energy markets. Based on the ownership unbundling requirements of the Third Energy Package, Lithuania successfully reformed the electricity sector by separating transmission from generation and supply activities. In 2010, four blocks of energy companies were established (consisting of energy transmission, production, distribution and maintenance activities). Ownership unbundling was aimed at increasing the overall efficiency of the electricity system, preventing discrimination against new market participants connecting to the grid, optimizing the use and development of infrastructure, incentivizing economic investment and ensuring competitive prices for electricity consumers. Owing to historical factors, Lithuania’s high voltage electricity transmission grid is directly interconnected with the high voltage grids of Latvia, Belarus and the Russian Federation. These interconnections allow extensive exchanges of power with such neighbouring systems. However, a core objective of Lithuania’s energy strategy is integration of its power system into the common European electricity market as well as synchronous interconnection with the European Continental Power Network of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). Seeking integration into European Union energy systems, a number of energy projects are under way.
A marine underwater high voltage cable (Estlink I) was completed in 2006 as a result of a joint venture between power companies in Finland and the Baltic States. Estlink I allows the transfer of electricity between Finland and Estonia, but in a limited capacity (350 MW). After a successful trial operation period, Estlink II, the interconnection between Estonia and Finland with a capacity of 650 MW, commenced commercial operations at the beginning of February 2014. The electricity is then transferred through Estonia to the electricity transmission grids of Latvia and Lithuania. As constituent parts of the integration of the Baltic electricity market into the common European electricity market, new interconnection lines between Lithuania and Sweden (NordBalt) and Lithuania and Poland (LitPol Link) were installed at the end of 2015.
NordBalt is a 700 MW submarine power cable between Lithuania and Sweden. This electricity bridge enables Lithuania to exchange electricity with countries situated in northern Europe and diversifies sources of electricity supply.
LitPol Link is a 500 MW electricity link between Lithuania and Poland which connects the three Baltic States, namely Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, to the European Union energy market and system. This interconnection is a crucial step towards integration of the Baltic States’ electricity grids with those of continental Europe.
The Baltic States also share the view that their electricity system must operate synchronously with the continental European network. This goal was confirmed jointly by the prime ministers of the Baltic States in 2014, when they stated that synchronization should be fulfilled by 2025. The importance of such synchronization is also recognized in the framework of European Union energy policy. This project is included within the European Energy Security Strategy and the European Union Energy Union as a project of common interest and of critical importance to European Union energy security. The goal of implementing the Baltic States’ synchronization with the continental European networks by 2025 is also included in a reinforced BEMIP.
The National Integrated Energy and Climate Plan of the Republic of Lithuania and the revised National Energy Independence Strategy does not foresee development of nuclear power in Lithuania. These strategic documents are focused on renewable energy sources and energy efficiency. By 2030 Lithuania has committed to achieve a 45% share of renewable energy in total final energy consumption and cumulative end use energy savings at least equivalent to 27.279 TW?h.
1.2.2. Structure of electric power sector
Electricity in Lithuania is produced from thermal, hydropower and other renewable sources, with installed capacities of 1914 MW, 1028 MW and 717 MW, respectively. The main generators are Elektrenai (condensing), Vilnius combined heat and power plant (CHP), Kaunas CHP, Kaunas hydroelectric power plant (HPP) and Kruonis pumped storage plant (PSPP), in addition to other small scale hydroelectric, wind, solar, biomass, biogas, waste and other renewable sources.
AB ESO is the Lithuanian distribution network operator. ESO distributes and transmits electrical power throughout the entire country and is a distribution network operator. The grid is made up of low and medium voltage lines and equipment.
The electrical power provided through ESO’s distribution grid reaches more than 1.577 million clients.
Litgrid AB, the Lithuanian electricity transmission system operator, maintains stable operation of the national power system, controls electricity flows and enables competition in an open domestic electricity market. Litgrid is responsible for integrating the national power system into the European power infrastructure and electricity market. The company also operates strategic cross-border electricity links, namely, NordBalt and LitPol.
1.2.3. Main indicators
Table 3 contains data on electricity production, consumption and capacity, and Table 4 shows energy related ratios.
TABLE 3. ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND CAPACITY
|Average annual growth rate (%)|
|Capacity of electrical plants (GW(e))|
|- Other renewable||N.A.||N.A.||0,001||0,032||0,158||0,202||0,184||0.184||33.6|
|Electricity production (TWh)|
|- Other renewable||N.A.||N.A.||0,001||0,250||0,520||0,506||0,572||0.630||43.1|
|Total Electricity consumption (TWh)||11,559||16,430||10,088||11,738||12,141||12,540||
1 Electricity transmission losses are not deducted.
* Latest available data.
TABLE 4. ENERGY RELATED RATIOS
|Energy consumption per capita (GJ/capita)||148.3||182.7||87.6||114.6||95||103,1||107,0||114.7||115.5|
|Electricity consumption per capita (kW h/capita)||2973.0||4023.5||2516.7||3187||3470||3907||4056||4265||4373|
|Electricity production/Energy production (%)||171.7||50.2||29.5||32||32.4||23,4||19,9||17,7||15.4|
|Nuclear/Total electricity (%)||N.A.||60.0||73.7||69.9||N.A.||N.A.||N.A.||N.A.||N.A.|
|Ratio of external dependency (%)1||95.2||69.8||52.9||53.5||81||74.6||74.8||73,5||74.6|
1 Net import/Total energy consumption.
* Latest available data.
2. NUCLEAR POWER SITUATION
2.1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The decision to build a nuclear power plant in the Baltic region for electricity supply to the Baltic States, Belarus and Kaliningrad was made by the former Government of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1970s. A site on the shore of Drukšiai Lake in Lithuania, near the borders with Latvia and Belarus was selected. Construction of the first unit of the Ignalina NPP commenced in April 1978; the second unit followed in April 1980, and the third unit in 1985. The town of Visaginas (formerly Snieckus) was built for the workers of the Ignalina NPP. The first unit was commissioned in December 1983 and the second in August 1987. In August 1988, the former USSR Council of Ministers suspended the construction of the third unit. In November 1993 the Government of Lithuania decided to abandon the construction of Unit 3 and dismantled the existing structure. The development of the Ignalina NPP design was carried out by the Research and Development Institute for Energy Technology (VNIPIET) of the Russian Federation. The development of the Accident Localization System was carried out by the Sverdlovsk branch of the VNIPIET. Metal structures of the main building were designed by the main design office of Leningrad Steel Design. The turbine hall, the open distributive system and the auxiliary facilities were developed by the Atomic Energy Design Organization of Ukraine. Ignalina NPP was intended to be the pilot NPP for the RBMK-1500 reactor type. The scientific supervisor of the RBMK-1500 project was the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute of Russia. The principal designer of the nuclear steam supply system was the Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (RDIPE — Russian abbreviation NIKIET) in Moscow. These two institutes prepared and published the technical safety justification of the RBMK-1500 reactor in 1987. These institutes, together with the Research and Development Institute for Energy Technology, prepared the technical safety justification of the Ignalina NPP in 1988. This safety report came closer to Western standards in comparison with the technical safety justification of the RBMK-1500 reactor. However, the technical safety justification of the Ignalina NPP was not officially approved.
In 1999, the decision was made to shut down Unit 1 of the Ignalina NPP before 2005, and in 2002 it was decided to shut down Unit 2 in 2009.
2.1.2. Current organizational structure
The following state institutions and bodies are involved in nuclear power related activities:
Ministry of Energy;
State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI);
Ministry of Health;
Radiation Protection Centre;
Ministry of Environment;
Environmental Protection Agency;
Lithuanian Geological Survey;
Ministry of Economy and Innovation;
Ministry of Social Security and Labour;
Ministry of Transport and Communications;
Ministry of National Defence;
Ministry of the Interior;
Ministry of Education, Science and Sport;
State Security Department;
Governmental Emergencies Commission;
The Ministry of Energy is responsible for the implementation of state policy and organizes bilateral and multilateral international cooperation in the sphere of nuclear energy; it is also the responsible authority for promotion and ownership of nuclear facilities. The Ministry of Energy is the owner of the Ignalina NPP and is responsible for a broad range of activities: tariffs, the pricing system, organization and financial audits. The Ministry supervises the nuclear power sector and is responsible for the preparation of regulatory acts governing nuclear power and for coordination of assistance for nuclear safety improvements.
In 2018 the Law on the Management of Radioactive Waste was amended. Through amendments of the Law, the state enterprise Ignalina NPP was assigned as the sole responsible entity for safe management of all of Lithuania’s radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel including disposal. The Radioactive Waste Management Agency was reorganized and merged with the state enterprise Ignalina NPP.
The Ministry of Economy and Innovation is responsible for issuing licences for the export, import and transit of strategic goods. “Strategic goods” are defined as goods, materials, equipment, technologies, software and services which are subject to export, import and transit control.
VATESI is the main regulatory and supervisory institution of nuclear safety and physical security. It sets safety and security requirements, issues licences and permits, and performs supervisory activities, safety assessments, regulatory inspections and other functions. The mission of VATESI is the state regulation and supervision of safety and security of nuclear facilities, activities with nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle materials, and activities with sources of ionizing radiation used in the nuclear power sector in order to protect the public and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. VATESI is a state institution, established in 1991. The head of VATESI reports directly to the President and the Government. The main tasks of VATESI are the following:
State regulation and supervision of nuclear safety at the Ignalina NPP and radioactive waste management facilities;
Supervision of use of nuclear materials and technologies for peaceful purposes (application of the IAEA and EURATOM safeguards, import/export control);
State regulation and supervision of physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle materials and sources of ionizing radiation used in the nuclear power sector;
State regulation and supervision of transportation of nuclear fuel cycle materials, nuclear and fissile material;
State regulation and supervision of radiation protection of workers at nuclear facilities;
State regulation and supervision of emergency preparedness at nuclear facilities.
The Ministry of Health does the following:
Prepares and approves standard acts and rules on the health of the personnel of nuclear facilities and the population residing in the monitored zones of the facility;
Undertakes environmental health studies of radiation impact on people and the environment and establishes health protection requirements;
Agrees on the siting for nuclear facilities and undertakes state environmental health analysis of their construction;
Takes part in the authorization of the constructed or reconstructed nuclear facilities, and issues environmental health passports for work with radioactive materials and other sources of ionizing radiation;
Establishes the standards for medical examination for personnel working with radioactive materials and sources of ionizing radiation, the frequency of the examination and contraindications, and controls compliance with the standards;
Monitors the health of nuclear facility personnel and the residents of the monitored zone of the facility;
Ensures the preparedness of medical institutions to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear or radiological accident;
Establishes radiation protection norms for the population and controls compliance with them;
Organizes medical examination of the containment forces of a nuclear accident and the population affected by radiation exposure and submits findings and proposals for the reduction of radiation exposure;
Determines occupational diseases for personnel in the sphere of nuclear energy and studies the causes of the diseases;
Carries out education on radiation protection of the population.
Most of these functions are delegated to the Radiation Protection Centre (RPC), which is the regulatory body that coordinates the activities of the executive and other bodies of public administration and local government in the field of radiation protection, monitoring and expert examination of public exposure. Among other responsibilities, the RPC is responsible for supervising the fulfilment of the requirements regarding radiation protection of workers (excluding in nuclear facilities) and the general public from negative impacts caused by ionizing radiation. In case of a nuclear accident at the Ignalina NPP, RPC presents recommendations to the State Emergency Commission, all levels of Emergency Management Centres and executive and other bodies of public administration for the reduction of exposure doses and prevention of deterministic and stochastic effects of radiation on the public and emergency workers. RPC performs analysis of foods, drinking water and other samples contaminated by radionuclides, and presents suggestions to the Ministry of Health to approve foods and their raw materials, drinking water and temporary maximum permissible levels of radioactive contamination for the emergency consequences liquidation period. It also organizes supervision and control of their compliance. Also, RPC presents suggestions to the Ministry of Health about the necessity of applying iodine prophylaxis and provides information to the public, within the limits of its competence, about protective actions. In order to continually ensure emergency preparedness, RPC has approved an emergency preparedness plan and established an internal emergency preparedness office (EPO).
The Ministry of Environment or its authorized institution, according to the manner set out by legal acts, supervises the building of nuclear installations, prepares and approves methodology to assess damage caused by ionizing radiation to the environment and its compensation, and periodically informs the general public and the state and municipal authorities on the radiation situation in the country.
The Ministry of Social Security and Labour is responsible for compliance with the requirements of labour, safety at work and related statutory acts.
The Ministry of Transport and Communications participates in the drafting of laws and subordinate legislation and the training and certification of personnel who transport nuclear and radioactive materials.
The Fire and Rescue Department is the coordinating institution with respect to the preparation of emergency plans and their implementation in the event of an accident at the Ignalina NPP. The department organizes the training sessions for population protection in the event of a nuclear accident.
The Ministry of the Interior ensures fire protection of the NPP and other nuclear facilities. It also ensures physical protection of the NPP, other nuclear facilities located close to State borders and nuclear materials during transport across the country. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the preparation, coordination and implementation of the interdepartmental antiterrorist and antipenetration action plans and the investigation of cases of theft and illegal possession of nuclear and radioactive materials and dual use items. It implements a system that gauges the trustworthiness of personnel of nuclear facilities and personnel involved in the transportation of nuclear material.
The State Security Department exercises prevention of subversive, sabotage and terrorist acts, as well as other offences aimed at damaging the interests of state security at nuclear facilities, in their environment, and on transportation routes for nuclear and radioactive materials. Together with the Ministry of the Interior it gauges the trustworthiness of personnel of nuclear facilities and personnel involved in the transportation of nuclear material.
The Governmental Emergencies Commission is responsible for coordinating the activities of all the bodies and forces taking part in the containment of a nuclear accident and its consequences.
The local authorities, based on the Government approved state plan for protection of the population in the event of a nuclear accident, shall develop preparedness for nuclear and radiological accidents as well as the preventive measures envisaged in the municipality’s plan for control of emergency situations. In the event of a nuclear or radiological accident, local authorities shall inform the population about the radiation situation on the sites of nuclear installations and about the measures undertaken for civil protection.
2.2. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: OVERVIEW
2.2.1. Status and performance of nuclear power plants
The Ignalina NPP is the only nuclear power plant in Lithuania and is not operational (Table 5). It contains two RBMK-1500 reactors, belonging to the category of boiling water channel graphite moderated type reactors. The Ignalina NPP is located in the northeastern part of Lithuania. The power plant was built as part of the then Soviet Union’s North-West Unified Power System. Ignalina NPP Unit 1 was connected to the grid at the end of 1983, and Unit 2 in August 1987. The design lifetime of the units was projected to be until 2014 and 2017, respectively. In total, four units were originally planned to be built on the Ignalina NPP site. Construction of the third unit was suspended in 1988 for political reasons, and construction of the fourth unit never started. Ignalina NPP Unit 1 was shut down on 31 December 2004 and Unit 2 on 31 December 2009 in compliance with the protocol for Lithuania’s accession to the European Union.
Defuelling of the Unit 1 reactor was started in 2006 and was completed in December 2009. Some of the removed spent fuel assemblies (in total 978) were transported to Unit 2 for after-burning and the remaining assemblies were put into spent fuel storage pools. Unit 1 is maintained in the post-operation state, based on the VATESI operation licence and in accordance with the requirements of the technical specification for Unit 1 operation during the fuel removal from the spent fuel storage pools.
After shutdown, Unit 2 was maintained in the post-operation state based on the VATESI operation licence and in accordance with the requirements of the technical specification for operation of Unit 2. Defuelling of Unit 2 was started in 2010 but suspended because of the lack of free space in the existing storage facility and spent fuel pools and while waiting for the new Interim Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility to be put into operation. The defuelling was restarted in September 2016 after VATESI issued a licence for operation of the Interim Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility. Fuel removal from the Unit 2 reactor was completed in February 2018. Defuelling of the spent fuel pools in the units is planned to be completed by 2022.
Decommissioning of various Unit 1 and Unit 2 facilities is under way. These activities are performed in accordance with the Ignalina NPP final decommissioning plan and in line with the Unit 1 and Unit 2 decommissioning projects.
Projects that are currently being implemented are related to dismantling and decontamination (D&D) of the Ignalina NPP systems and equipment. Each Ignalina NPP D&D project is implemented only after approval of the technological design and corresponding safety analysis report by the regulatory body, including development of an environmental impact assessment for each D&D project and issuance of an affirmative decision by the competent authority on the admissibility to perform the D&D activities under consideration. The projects are implemented in compliance with the technological solutions and the sequence developed and accepted in the technological design documents and within clearly defined equipment dismantling boundaries.
TABLE 5. STATUS AND PERFORMANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS**
|Data source: IAEA - Power Reactor Information System (PRIS).|
|Note: Table is completely generated from PRIS data to reflect the latest available information and may be more up to date than the text of the report.|
** Latest available data.
+ Date, when first major placing of concrete, usually for the base mat of the reactor building is done.
++ Date of the first connection to the grid.
Note: UCF (unit capability factor) for the latest available year (only applicable to reactors in operation).
2.2.2. Permanent shutdown and decommissioning process
Decommissioning: Information and Plans
On 5 October 1999, the Seimas approved the National Energy Strategy, in accordance with which Unit 1 at the Ignalina NPP was to be shut down by 2005, given the long term substantial financial support from the European Union, G7 and other countries and international financial institutions. On 31 December 2004, Unit 1 was shut down in compliance with Protocol No. 4 of Lithuania’s European Union Accession Agreement; Unit 2 operated until the end of 2009.
On 19 February 2001, the Government approved the decommissioning programme for Ignalina NPP Unit 1, envisaging measures to be considered from 2001 to 2004. On 2 February 2005, the Government of Lithuania approved the new decommissioning programme for both units of the Ignalina NPP. The main objectives of the programme are the following:
To ensure safe operation of the Ignalina NPP during the preparation for decommissioning and during the actual decommissioning activities.
To develop, modify and add to the legal acts related to the Ignalina NPP decommissioning.
To ensure the work of the Ignalina NPP Decommissioning Service and Unit 1 Surveillance Service.
To evaluate (in the order defined by the legal acts) both the projects undertaken in preparation for decommissioning and the decommissioning projects with respect to nuclear safety, radiation protection and physical security, as well as to license them.
To mitigate negative social and economic effects. It also specifies necessary organizational, technical, economic and social measures to achieve the above mentioned objectives.
On 25 February 2005, the Minister of Economy approved the plan on implementation of measures of the decommissioning programme for Ignalina NPP Units 1 and 2, envisaging measures for addressing environmental, social and economic problems, as well as consequences of premature decommissioning. The plan was reissued once a year. In 2014, it was replaced by the Interinstitutional Action Plan, covering a three year period, with annual updates.
The main objectives set established the action plan include the following:
To ensure a safe and fluent Ignalina NPP decommissioning process by using allocated funds in a transparent and efficient manner;
To mitigate the negative social and economic consequences within the Ignalina NPP region as a result of the Ignalina NPP decommissioning.
In order to reach the first objective, several tasks must be fulfilled, including the following:
To ensure a safe and efficient Ignalina NPP decommissioning process and its supervision;
To develop a radioactive waste management infrastructure based on state of the art technologies, and ensure safe and effective Ignalina NPP operational and decommissioning radioactive waste management.
The following tasks are set for reaching the second objective:
To provide for the possibility for Ignalina NPP employees who have already been dismissed or are to be dismissed to integrate into the labour market and mitigate dismissal consequences;
To reduce energy consumption in public facilities and multistory buildings within the Ignalina NPP region.
As appendices, the action plan contains Measures for Implementation of the Ignalina NPP Decommissioning Interdepartmental Action Plan objectives and tasks for the period of 2016–2018 (amended), and the assessment criteria for reaching the above mentioned objectives.
The Final Decommissioning Plan
Pursuant to the provisions of the Law on Nuclear Energy and General Requirements for Decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP, VD-EN-01-99, which were in force at the time of preparation for decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP, the Ignalina NPP prepared a final decommissioning plan (FDP), which was approved by the Ministry of Economy in July 2005, with the latest update in August 2014. In compliance with the Nuclear Safety Requirements, BSR-1.5.1-2015, Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities, the FDP shall be reviewed at least once every five years and should consider the experience gained during the implementation of the decommissioning process, changes in the decommissioning strategy, decommissioning performance schedule, financing, etc.
Though the final date of termination of the overall decommissioning process has shifted over time, the adopted decommissioning strategy remains unchanged and is further implemented as a strategy of immediate dismantling.
The last version of the FDP was updated and approved by the Minister of Energy on 25 August 2014. In the course of 2018–2019, the FDP will be updated and take into consideration goals and activities for the near future and the long term:
Complete defueling of both units;
Further modification and isolation of systems not important to safety;
Obtaining of the decommissioning licence;
Dismantling of separate installations, systems and equipment no longer needed to ensure the safe operation and maintenance of the Ignalina NPP;
Procurement of engineering services for optioneering of D&D of Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor structures, systems and components together with the graphite stacks (denoted as the Reactor Zone R3);
Processing of radioactive waste retrieved from the operational waste storage facilities;
Construction and commissioning of radioactive waste disposal facilities (landfill disposal modules and the near surface repository);
Start of demolition of some of the auxiliary emptied buildings on the Ignalina NPP site;
This is also based on the Ignalina NPP decommissioning megaproject schedule and the allocated funds until the final status of the Ignalina NPP site is reached (i.e. allocated the status of the “green field”, but with some buildings to be allocated the status of the “brown field”, including radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities remaining in operation after the decommissioning). Approvals from all the relevant state institutions (VATESI, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Security and Labour) have already been obtained, and approval by the Ministry of Energy is expected by the end of 2020.
Decommissioning Project for Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 Final Shutdown and Defueling Phase
The decommissioning projects for the Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 final shutdown and defuelling phase, including the safety analysis reports and environmental impact assessments, were prepared and approved by the competent state authorities in 2006 and 2010, respectively.
The decommissioning projects cover work which has to be performed within the frame of prolonged operational licences for Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2. Decommissioning projects provide descriptions of the Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems that may be modified and isolated at each defuelling stage as a consequence of losing their functions to ensure safe operation of other safety systems remaining in operation and normal operation functions.
The projects do not cover dismantling work, since they are performed within the frame of separate process equipment D&D projects for Ignalina NPP Unit 1 and Unit 2.
The following D&D projects have already been successfully implemented:
Dismantling of equipment located in Bld. 117/1,2 (hydro vessels, valves and pipes of the fast acting subsystem of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), which lost functionality after the reactor final shutdown owing to the absence of conditions requiring actuation of this subsystem of the ECCS);
Dismantling of Unit 1 Bld. 119 (boiler house) equipment;
Dismantling of Unit 1 turbine hall (Bld. G1) systems and equipment;
Dismantling of systems and equipment of Unit 1 reactor gas circuit (Bld. V1) (1st stage);
Dismantling of Unit 1 control, electrics and de-aerator equipment (Bld. D-0,1).
D&D projects in progress:
Dismantling of Unit 2 turbine hall (Bld. G2) systems and equipment (with the major part of equipment being already dismantled);
Dismantling of Unit 2 control, electrics and de-aerator equipment (Bld. D-2);
Dismantling of monitored area equipment (Bld. 111, Bld. 137…);
Organization of primary waste treatment area in Unit A-1;
Organization of metallic waste treatment facility in Bld. 130/2.
2.2.3. Plant upgrading, plant life management and licence renewals
Historical Enhancement of Ignalina NPP Performance
The safety analysis report (SAR) of 1995–1996 was the first safety analysis done on a Soviet-design NPP by non-former Soviet Union countries. Specialists from the Ignalina NPP, Canada, Russian Federation (main RBMK designer RDIPE), Sweden, United Kingdom and United States of America participated in the project. The SAR team supported the Ignalina NPP management, showing that (i) an adequate safety case for continuing operation had been demonstrated; (ii) the safety case would be adequate to the point of first gap closure, which will be the lifetime limiting factor; and (iii) the plant’s safety standards and practices had been assessed and recommendations for improvement had been made and accepted by the Ignalina NPP. A significant conclusion stated in the SAR is that none of the analysed safety concerns required immediate shutdown of the plant.
The review of the safety analysis report (RSR) of 1995–1997 was an independent review of the SAR, performed by experts from France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States of America. The RSR team agreed with almost all of the SAR team’s recommendations for improvement and made some additional recommendations. They, however, were not able to agree that a fully adequate safety case had been demonstrated and gave a set of recommendations both on additional analyses and on safety improvement measures to be implemented. These recommendations formed a basis for the Ignalina NPP’s Second Safety Improvement Programme (SIP-2), approved in 1997.
Lithuania, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States of America and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development participated in the performance of the SIP-2, which started in 1997. The objective of the SIP-2 was to improve the safety of the Ignalina NPP with reference to equipment, operating procedures and management to a level of international good standards.
The safety of Ignalina NPP Unit 2 operation was based upon Safety Analysis Report 2 (SAR-2). SAR-2 was prepared in 2000 and after review by VATESI in September 2004, the Ignalina NPP received an indefinitely valid licence for operation of Unit 2.
From 2006 to 2008, the Ignalina NPP updated the SAR for Unit 2. The update was implemented taking into account the results of modifications, analytical work and changes to the Ignalina NPP safety management system carried out between 2001 and 2007. Based on the review report of SAR-2 (RSR-2), VATESI requirements, as well as on the Ignalina NPP’s own initiative as part of the process of updating SAR-2, 127 modifications of Unit 2’s main equipment and 50 analytical work projects were carried out. The results of the analytical work were used as a basis for implementation of a number of modifications at Unit 2, such as the use of uranium–erbium fuel with 2.8% enrichment, commissioning of a diverse shutdown system (DSS) and use of cluster control rods. Implementation of these modifications allowed for a significant increase in nuclear safety of Ignalina NPP Unit 2.
The main modification at Ignalina NPP Unit 2 was installation of the DSS. In October 2004, the DSS was put into trial industrial operation. The regulation requirement on having two independent shutdown systems available was implemented. The DSS implementation was fully completed in 2008, including training of operating and maintenance staff.
In 2001, the Ignalina NPP made an important step towards the management of beyond design basis accidents — in addition to emergency procedures, symptom based emergency operating instructions were introduced. These instructions are easy to handle in accidents for which it is difficult to correctly diagnose the cause. In order to prevent the evolution of design basis accidents into beyond design basis accidents and to mitigate the consequences of beyond design basis accidents, the Guidelines on the Management of Beyond Design Accidents were developed at the Ignalina NPP for Unit 2 in 2006. In order to implement these strategies, the existing Ignalina NPP equipment was modified and Ignalina NPP personnel involved in emergency response activities were trained from 2007 to 2008.
To increase the safety of Unit 2, allowing detection of small coolant leaks at early stages of accidents, a leak before break concept was implemented at the Ignalina NPP in 2007.
After the permanent shutdown of the Ignalina NPP units, the emergency operating procedures, including severe accident management guidelines, were revised and applied to the current state of the Ignalina NPP units.
Pursuant to the Law on Nuclear Safety, the licence holder (for Ignalina NPP — state enterprise Ignalina NPP) shall prepare a periodic safety evaluation report for a nuclear facility not less than every 10 years and shall submit it to the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate for review. The periodic safety analysis report for Unit 1 was developed and submitted to the regulatory body in March 2017 for review. Such a report for Ignalina NPP Unit 2 is expected to be prepared in 2020.
In response to the event at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi NPP, the European Union’s stress tests were carried out at the Ignalina NPP in 2011–2012. In accordance with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) specification, the stress tests were carried out for the two permanently shutdown Ignalina NPP units, the operating dry spent fuel storage facility and the new interim spent fuel storage facility, which was under construction at that point. Taking into account the results and conclusions of the Ignalina NPP stress tests as well as suggestions and recommendations provided by peer review experts, the Ignalina NPP action plan was developed and approved by VATESI. Continuing the participation in follow-up activities for the stress tests, VATESI developed the Plan of Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Lithuania (National Action Plan). This plan is associated with post-Fukushima lessons learned and stress test peer review recommendations and suggestions as well as the results of the IAEA mission on emergency preparedness review that was conducted in Lithuania in 2012. The National Action Plan was prepared in accordance with ENSREG requirements and was presented during the National Action Plan workshops in 2013 and 2015, which were organized by ENSREG. All 14 measures of Lithuania’s National Action Plan have been completed (the last two measures were completed in March 2018). All safety improvement measures related to nuclear safety of the Ignalina NPP units and the operating dry spent fuel storage facility and the new interim spent fuel storage facility were completed in 2015. More details on Lithuania’s participation in European stress tests and follow-up activity are provided on the ENSREG web site.
2.3. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER
2.3.1. Nuclear power development strategy
The revised National Energy Independence Strategy does not foresee development of nuclear power in Lithuania.
2.3.2. Project management
2.3.3. Project funding
2.3.4. Electric grid development
2.3.6. Public acceptance
Historically, public acceptance of nuclear power in Lithuania was quite high. Under the treaty of accession to the European Union where Lithuania committed itself to close the Ignalina NPP, popular initiative brought the issue to a referendum on 12 October 2008 regarding the extension of the operation of the Ignalina NPP. In that referendum, 88.58% of the votes (or 1 156 738 total) were in support of the extension. However, the referendum was announced invalid due to low turnout, which stood at 48.44% and was lower than the required 50%.
After the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP and with two new NPP projects under development near Lithuania’s borders (Ostrovets NPP in Belarus and Kaliningrad NPP), public acceptance of nuclear power in Lithuania declined. The advisory referendum on supporting the new Visaginas NPP construction in Lithuania was held in the middle of October 2012. The results of the referendum revealed the prevailing negative public opinion on the construction of a new NPP. Just 34% of the voters (463 966) supported the construction of a new NPP, while 63% of the voters (853 163) were against it.
2.4. ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTION OF NPPs
2.5. ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN OPERATION OF NPPs
2.6. ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN DECOMMISSIONING OF NPPs
Table 7 lists the main safety related suppliers for the Ignalina NPP.
TABLE 7. MAIN IGNALINA NPP SAFETY RELATED SUPPLIERS
|No.||Supplier||Project ID||Scope of supply/name of contract||Contract award date||Contract validity term|
|1.||Consortium GNS–NUKEM technologies GmbH (Germany)|
Subcontractors: MAG Grimma, Höfer & Bechtel, Geitzenaurer GmbH (Germany); Škoda JS a.s. (Czech Republic); NUVIA (United Kingdom); Ansaldo (Italy); Konecranes (Finland); Lithuanian Energy Institute (Lithuania), etc.
|B1||Implementation of the project “Interim Storage Facility for RBMK Spent Nuclear Fuel Assemblies from Ignalina NPP Units 1 and 2” (Project B1) ||2005-01-13||2021-08-24|
|2.||NUKEM technologies GmbH (Germany)|
Subcontractors: Ansaldo Nucleare, Babcock Noell (Italy); Comex Nucleare (France); “Siempelkamp”, Cofely-Harwig, BNG kransysteme (Germany); JSC “RADICO” (Estonia); Lithuanian Energy Institute, JSC “ALGA”, JSC “Ekobana”, JSC “Tecos” (Lithuania), etc.
|B2/3/4||Implementation of the project “The Procurement of a Turnkey Contract Basis of Lot 1 — Design and Construction of a New Solid Waste Retrieval Facility and Lot 2 — Design and Construction of New Solid Waste Treatment and Storage Facilities” (Project B2/3/4) ||2005-12-01||2020-09-30|
|3.||AREVA (now ORANO) (former leader), JVP Specialus Montažas-NTP, (leader), ANDRA, Lithuanian Energy Institute||B25-1||Implementation of the project “Near Surface Repository for Low and Intermediate Level Short Lived Radioactive Waste (Design)” (Project B25- 1)||2009-10-23||2019-09-30|
|4.||Group of entities acting on the basis of the joint activities agreement:|
JSC Eurovia Lietuva (responsible partner), JSC Vilstata, JSC Ekobana
|B19-2||Implementation of the project “Construction of Ignalina NPP Landfill Facility for Very Low Level Radioactive Waste as well as Design, Construction and Connection of Engineering Structures Sections to the Landfill Facility and Existing Ignalina NPP Infrastructure” (Project B19-2)||2017-06-22||2020-08-14|
|Procurement of Ignalina NPP Safety Related Systems Pipelines and Equipment Metal Inspection and Testing Services||2017-02-21|
|6.||JSC Svertas Group, |
Lithuanian Energy Institute,
Empresarios Agrupados Internacional, S.A.,
TUV NORD Ensys GmbH & Co. Kg
|Upgrade of Bituminised Waste Vaults (B20)||2018 07 23||2023|
MAIN INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN IGNALINA NPP DECOMMISSIONING
Ministry of Energy;
Ministry of Environment;
Environment Protection Agency;
RPC established by the Ministry of Health;
Central Project Management Agency;
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
2.7. FUEL CYCLE, INCLUDING WASTE MANAGEMENT
The Development Programme on Radioactive Waste Management was approved by the Government on 23 December 2015.
The ultimate strategic goals of the programme are safe management of all radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel available in Lithuania, protection of people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation and avoiding imposing undue burdens on future generations.
The first task of the programme is to reduce the generation of radioactive waste. Minimization of waste generation should be achieved via waste clearance and the development and introduction of technologies to reduce the amount or activity of radioactive waste.
The second task of the programme is to achieve a high level of nuclear and radiation safety and environmental protection by managing spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. To achieve this task, measures for management of all classes of radioactive waste are set out.
Very low level short lived radioactive waste accumulated in Ignalina NPP storage facilities will be retrieved and sorted in accordance with domestic requirements. After initial treatment, the waste will be disposed of in a very low level waste repository, which will be constructed near the Ignalina NPP. Decommissioning and accumulated operational waste before the start of operation of the repository will be collected in the buffer storage facility.
Short lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste meeting low and intermediate level waste acceptance criteria for the repository will be placed into the reinforced concrete vaults of the near surface repository to be constructed. Radioactive waste accumulated in the current Ignalina NPP storage facilities will be retrieved, sorted, treated and stored in accordance with the requirements in new treatment and storage facilities (under commissioning).
Long lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste and spent sealed radiation sources will be separated from the short lived waste and loaded into appropriate containers. The containers with long lived radioactive waste will be stored in a long lived waste storage facility. Graphite from the dismantled reactors will be moved to the storage facility.
For storage of spent nuclear fuel, Lithuania has selected the dry storage option. After the storage period, the spent nuclear fuel should be disposed of in a geological repository. The possibility of extending the period of dry storage for spent nuclear fuel will be assessed in the future.
The third task of the programme is to ensure the sustainable management of spent fuel and long lived radioactive waste in the long term. To implement this, task measures are set out for preparing the concept of geological repository and site selection as well as the design and construction of a geological repository.
Radioactive waste stored in the Maišiagala radioactive waste storage facility will be retrieved and transported to the Ignalina NPP for storage and the Maišiagala storage facility will be rehabilitated for uncontrolled use.
All radioactive waste management facilities in Lithuania are situated in the vicinity of the Ignalina NPP; the only exception is the Maišiagala storage facility, which is about 30 km northwest of Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. Since the beginning of the 2019, state enterprise Ignalina NPP has been the operator of the Maišiagala storage facility. The Maišiagala “Radon” type facility was constructed in 1963 near Vilnius for storage of institutional radioactive waste and was in operation from 1964 to 1989. Unconditioned radioactive waste was placed into an underground concrete vault. The waste stored here is of different types (e.g. short lived low level and long lived). Disused sealed sources were disposed of with or without biological shielding. Static electricity neutralizers containing plutonium and plates with tritium were loaded into the vault through an open hatch. Every year the waste accumulated in the vault was covered by concrete. During closure in 1989, the vault was covered by a concrete slab and a layer of sand was poured above it. In summer 2006, a new capping system was installed on the top of the vault. Watertight polyethylene membranes stop infiltration of rainwater into the vault. An environmental monitoring programme has been developed and implemented in order to demonstrate the performance of the capping system. However, the new capping system is not sufficient, taking into consideration the inventory of waste. As the content of long lived nuclides is rather high, the intrusion risk after the institutional control period is too high. Currently, state enterprise Ignalina NPP performs surveillance and monitoring of the closed Maišiagala storage facility.
On 5 April 2018, the final decommissioning plan of the Maišiagala storage facility was approved by Lithuania’s Ministry of Energy, and the contract related to preparation of technical documentation for decommissioning of Maišiagala storage facility entered into force on 25 April 2019. Decommissioning of the Maišiagala storage facility is planned to be finished in 2023.
State enterprise Ignalina NPP also manages the institutional waste from industrial, medical and research facilities and transports it to storage facilities at the Ignalina NPP.
The operator of radioactive waste management facilities situated at the Ignalina NPP site is the state enterprise Ignalina NPP.
The intermediate spent nuclear fuel storage facility of dry type is located on the Ignalina NPP site at a distance of 1 km from the plant units and 400 meters from Drukšiai Lake. Twenty CASTOR RBMK and 98 CONSTOR RBMK-1500 casks with 51 spent nuclear fuel assemblies in each are stored in this facility. The total number of stored casks at the facility is 118 and the total quantity of spent nuclear fuel assemblies accommodated in the casks is 6016 units. Given the necessity of handling and storing 15 556 spent nuclear fuel assemblies from the shutdown Ignalina NPP units, the construction of a new dry type spent nuclear fuel storage facility (project B1) was completed in October 2015. The licence for operation and performance of hot trials of the facility was issued on 20 September 2016 by VATESI and the industrial operation of the facility started on 4 May 2017. The new interim spent nuclear fuel storage facility is designed to accommodate 201 CONSTOR RBMK-1500/M2 casks with spent nuclear fuel assemblies and store them for 50 years. The facility is also equipped with a fuel inspection hot cell, which provides the possibility for spent nuclear fuel repackaging and inspection during the storage period.
Solid radioactive waste generated at the Ignalina NPP was segregated into three groups by the surface dose rate according to standards that were applied in the former USSR and were applicable at the Ignalina NPP. There was no reprocessing of solid waste before it was dumped into on-site temporary storage facilities. All the waste from these temporary storage facilities will be retrieved, characterized, conditioned, packed and stored following the new radioactive waste classification system established in 2001 by the regulatory body, which follows the IAEA and European safety standards governing solid radioactive waste management principles. Therefore, the new Ignalina NPP solid radioactive waste management and storage facility was constructed at the Ignalina NPP site dedicated for retrieval, characterization, treatment and conditioning, and storage of operational and decommissioning waste. The licence for operation and performance of hot trials of the facility was issued on 12 October 2017 by the regulatory body.
Liquid radioactive waste at Ignalina NPP is collected in special tanks, from which part of it is directed to and is processed in the bitumen solidification facility. Currently, concentrate is cemented.
The rest of the liquid radioactive waste — spent ion exchange resins, perlite and sediments — is stored in special tanks. In 2006, the cementation facility and storage facility for cemented waste started operation. Conditioned waste will be disposed of in a near surface repository.
After storage, the waste will be disposed of in disposal facilities. Two disposal facilities are envisaged — a landfill facility for very low level radioactive waste and a near surface repository for low and intermediate level waste. The buffer storage for the landfill facility has been constructed and operation commenced in 2013. Construction of the landfill disposal modules is ongoing. It is anticipated that the disposal facility will be put into operation in 2021.
The near surface repository design was prepared by the joint venture partnership led by Specialus Montažas-NTP and approved by the relevant institutions. The technical design documentation and preliminary safety analysis report were approved by VATESI in April 2017. A licence for construction and operation was issued in November 2017 by the regulatory body. Currently, the tender for construction of the facility is ongoing. The disposal facility will be put into operation in 2023–2024.
There are no mining and milling, uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication or reprocessing activities in Lithuania.
2.8. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
2.8.1. R&D organizations
The Lithuanian Energy Institute, Centre for Physical Sciences and Technology, Kaunas University of Technology, and Vilnius Gediminas Technical University are involved in nuclear or nuclear related activities, mainly as technical support organizations (TSOs). These entities provide expertise and necessary technical/scientific support during preparation of safety submittals and safety reviews, and verification of safety justifications. Some of the TSOs are also involved in international projects implemented through international and bilateral cooperation.
The Lithuanian Energy Institute performs a wide range of nuclear related activities, some of which are listed below:
Safety assessment of NPPs;
Research related to construction of a new NPP in Lithuania;
Thermohydraulic analysis of accident and transient processes;
Assessment of thermohydraulic parameters in NPPs;
Simulation of radionuclide and aerosol transport;
Assessment of nuclear reactor core modifications and analysis of postulated reactivity accidents;
Safety analysis of thermonuclear fusion reactors;
Analysis of new generation NPPs;
Reliability estimation and control of energy systems;
Level 1 and Level 2 probabilistic safety assessment of NPPs;
Strength analysis of construction, piping and components in complex technical systems.
The activities of the Nuclear and Environmental Radioactivity Research Laboratory of the Centre for Physical Sciences and Technology include development and application of nuclear spectroscopy methods, radionuclide metrology and standardization, investigations in environmental radioactivity, radionuclide tracer studies, radioecological monitoring and dose assessment.
The Centre for Non-Destructive Testing at Kaunas University of Technology and the Laboratory of Welding and Material Analysis at Vilnius Gediminas Technical University are highly qualified in the indicated areas. They are equipped with modern instrumentation and also play an important role as TSOs.
With the aid of the European Commission, these facilities were equipped with modern instrumentation.
2.8.2. Development of advanced nuclear technologies
2.8.3. International cooperation and initiatives
Lithuania has or had sustained multilateral and bilateral projects, mostly concerning the safety of NPPs and radioactive waste management with Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
The main multilateral projects were the International RBMK Safety Review Consortium funded by the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme, Lord Marshall’s Users Group for Soviet Designed Reactors and the IAEA extra-budgetary programme on RBMK reactors. One of the most important projects for Lithuania was the international project Safety of Design Solutions and Operation of NPPs with RBMK Reactors, which covers a broad range of safety related topics, with Unit 2 of the Ignalina NPP used as a reference plant.
During the BARSELINA project (1992–2001) — level 1 and 2 probabilistic safety assessment of the Ignalina NPP was conducted by Lithuania, the Russian Federation and Sweden. This project provides a unified basis for the assessment of severe accident risks for RBMK type reactors and the preparation of remedial measures. Some of the improvements highlighted by the PSA have already been implemented at the Ignalina NPP.
Other projects of the Lithuanian–Swedish bilateral programme involved the application of modern non-destructive testing systems for in-service inspection of the pressure boundary system and the preparation of an Overall Plan for Radioactive Waste Management in Lithuania by Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. SKB. The project Fire and Flooding Protection helped to improve the entire fire protection system at the Ignalina NPP.
Further, the IAEA offers many courses for training nuclear specialists. One of the most important national technical cooperation projects, on the systematic approach to training for NPP personnel (completed in 2000), helped strengthen the safety and reliability of the Ignalina NPP.
There have been a number of projects implemented with the United States of America, financed by the Department of Energy and the United States Agency for International Development in the framework of the Nuclear Safety Assistance Programme for Lithuania. Cooperation in nuclear safety improvement at the Ignalina NPP with Japanese specialists also started in 1994. Under the framework of the Agreement of Cooperation for Safety Improvement at the Ignalina NPP signed in 1996, the Japan Science and Technology Agency launched two big projects: Cooperation on Plant Operation Management and Cooperation on Fuel Channel Integrity.
The Installation and Reactor Safety Company (GRS), of Germany, and the Lithuanian Energy Institute are involved in the cooperative project Analysis of Safety Aspects of the Ignalina NPP, which includes studies of neutron dynamics and thermohydraulics. The Lithuanian Energy Institute and the American Nuclear Society signed a memorandum of cooperation in February 2007, which was prolonged for another five year period in February 2011.
In 2009, the Lithuanian Energy Institute joined the European Technical Support Organization Network (ETSON), with members (at that time) including Bel V (Belgium), ÚJV (Czech Republic), VTT (Finland), IRSN (France) and GRS (Germany). In 2009, members of ETSON decided to create the European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute (ENSTTI). Thus, in 2009, two European TSOs (IRSN and the Lithuanian Energy Institute) created ENSTTI. Later, Bel V and GRS joined ENSTTI. The Lithuanian Energy Institute has actively participated in the following international collaborative projects:
Sixth Framework Programme:
Network of Excellence for the Sustainable Integration of European Research on Severe Accident Phenomenology and Management (SARNET) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2004–2008);
Nuclear Plant LIFE Prediction (NULIFE) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2006–2011).
Seventh Framework Programme:
Treatment and Disposal of Irradiated Graphite and Other Carbonaceous Waste (CARBOWASTE) — Lithuanian Energy Institute, Center for Physical Sciences and Technology (2008–2012);
REDOX Phenomena Controlling Systems — Center for Physical Sciences and Technology (2008–2012);
Safety and Efficacy of a New and Emerging Dental X ray Modality (SEDENTEXCT) — Vilnius University (2008–2011);
Fate of Repository Gases (FORGE) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2009–2013);
Network of Excellence for the Sustainable Integration of European Research on Severe Accident Phenomenology (SARNET2) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2009–2013);
MATerials TEsting and Rules (MATTER) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2011–2014);
Proposal for a harmonized European methodology for the safety assessment of innovative reactors with fast neutron spectrum planned to be built in Europe (SARGEN IV) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2012–2013);
New MS Linking for Advanced Cohesion in Euratom Research (NEWLANCER) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2011–2013);
Sustainable Network of Independent Technical Expertise for Radioactive Waste Disposal (SITEX) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2012–2013);
Code for European Severe Accident Management (CESAM) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2017);
CArbon-14 Source Term (CAST) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2018);
Advanced Safety Assessment: Extended PAS (ASAMPSA_E) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2016);
Building a platform for enhanced social research related to nuclear energy in Central and Eastern Europe (PLATENSO) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2016);
Nuclear Cogeneration Industrial Initiative — Research and Development Coordination (NC2I-R) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2015);
Assessment of Regional Capabilities for New Reactor Development through an Integrated Approach (ARCADIA) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2016);
Preparing NUGENIA for Horizon 2020 (NUGENIA-PLUS) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2013–2016).
Horizon 2020 Programme:
Implementation of activities described in the Road Map to Fusion during Horizon 2020 through a joint programme of the members of the EUROfusion consortium (EUROfusion) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2014–2018);
Baltic Region Initiative for Long Lasting Innovative Nuclear Technologies (BRILLIANT) — Lithuanian Energy Institute, Center for Physical Sciences and Technology, UAB VAE SPB (2015–2018);
Sustainable Network for Independent Technical Expertise of Radioactive Waste Disposal — Interactions and Implementation (SITEX-II) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2015–2017);
Increasing Safety in NPPs by Covering Gaps in Environmental Fatigue Assessment (INCEFA-PLUS) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2015–2020);
In-Vessel Melt Retention Severe Accident Management Strategy for Existing and Future NPPs (IVMR) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2015–2019);
FAST Nuclear Emergency Tools (FASTNET) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2015–2019);
European Joint Programme for the Integration of Radiation Protection Research (CONCERT) — Radiation Protection Centre (2015–2020);
History of Nuclear Energy and Society (HoNESt) — European Humanities University (2015–2018);
Bentonite Mechanical Evolution (BEACON) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2017–2021);
Thermal treatment for radioactive waste minimization and hazard reduction (THERAMIN) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2017–2020);
Research and development in support of the GEMINI Initiative (GEMINI Plus) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2017–2020);
Management and Uncertainties of Severe Accidents (MUSA) — Lithuanian Energy Institute, Vytautas Magnus University (2019–2023);
Reduction of radiological consequences of design basis and design extension accidents (R2CA) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2019–2023);
Towards European licensing of SMR (ELSMOR) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2019–2023);
StakeHolder-based Analysis of Research for Decomissioning (SHARE) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2019–2021);
European Joint Programme on Radioactive Waste Management (EURAD) — Ignalina NPP, Lithuanian Energy Institute, Center for Physical Sciences and Technology (2019–2024).
INNOvative tools FOR dismantling of GRAPHite moderated nuclear reactors (INNO4GRAPH) — Lithuanian Energy Institute (2020–2023);
A number of Lithuanian experts also participate in IAEA training courses as Agency experts.
2.9. HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
Since nuclear energy is an integrated branch of the economy, it requires knowledge, and competent and experienced specialists employed in industry.
In line with provisions of the Plan for the Implementation of the National Energy Strategy, approved by Resolution No. X-1046 of Parliament, dated 18 January 2007, a national plan for the education of nuclear energy specialists was adopted in May 2011 by the joint order of the Minister of Education and Science and the Minister of Energy.
2.10. STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT
VATESI actively promotes the principal of transparency in discharging its activities. VATESI submits its annual report to the Government and the President and makes it accessible to the public online.
VATESI has quarterly meetings with the management of the Ignalina NPP in order to discuss the most important questions and resolve possible issues. As a routine practice, VATESI seeks opinions from industry on the new drafts of regulatory documents in order to ensure common understanding on the new regulations. VATESI researches and organizes a public opinion survey once every two years. In the 2016 survey, the public identified VATESI as a trusted state regulatory body. VATESI also asks the main stakeholders for feedback every year about the quality of VATESI’s administration services, partnership and cooperation.
In line with the ENSREG Draft Guidance for National Regulatory Organizations: Principles for Openness and Transparency, VATESI is developing open communication tools to ensure transparency. Ongoing dialogue and interaction with main licensees and other stakeholders are the main priorities in daily communication tasks.
While implementing delegated supervisory functions, VATESI provides public consultations on request from legal entities or on its own initiative. Meetings with licensees and consultations help to promote dialogue and more favourable working environments with a high degree of transparency. VATESI organized public opinion surveys regarding nuclear safety issues in 2009, 2011, 2014, 2016 and 2018.
Opportunities for the public to participate in the decision making process within the nuclear power sector have been provided since November 2017, after the entry into force of the amendment to the Law on Nuclear Safety, which implements Council Directive 2014/87/Euratom of 8 July 2014, amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom, establishing a community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations (Amendment of the Nuclear Safety Directive). The procedure for public participation is detailed in Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.1.5-2017 “Rules of Procedure for Public Participation in Decision Making in the Area of Nuclear Energy”, approved by the head of VATESI. These legal acts provide practical tools to involve the public in the decision making process and give the decision making process a higher level of transparency.
2.11. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
The main requirements for nuclear facility emergency preparedness are set out in the Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.3.1-2020 “Enforcement of Emergency Preparedness in Nuclear Facilities”, approved by Order No. 22.3-18 of the head of VATESI on 21 January 2020. These requirements oblige the operator of the nuclear facility to ensure prevention of accidents and incidents and, in the event of an accident, to perform the emergency preparedness tasks immediately. These requirements require the operator of a nuclear facility to develop an emergency preparedness plan complying with the prescribed requirements, which are based on IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 7, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency; IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-2.1, Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency; and IAEA Emergency Preparedness and Response Series No. EPR-METHOD (2003), Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, Updating IAEA-TECDOC-953.
The Ignalina NPP Emergency Plan is the main procedure to follow during organizational, technical, medical, evacuation and other activities in order to protect personnel and the environment from the consequences of accidents, natural disasters and human induced impacts. The Ignalina NPP Emergency Plan is supplemented by additional emergency response instructions dedicated to respond to emergencies at various nuclear facilities which are operated at Ignalina NPP site. Emergency plans, emergency procedures and instructions are tested before issuing a license or permit to operate a nuclear facility and later are tested on a yearly basis. The emergency plan shall be reviewed no less than once in three years and shall be submitted for revision to VATESI. The emergency plan shall also be reviewed after important alterations in operation and activities of a nuclear facility.
VATESI performs regular inspections at the Ignalina NPP to check that the emergency preparedness arrangements are implemented properly and are in line with requirements. This includes control of training and exercising of emergency response organization staff and facility workers, checking if emergency planning and response procedures and documents are in place and are valid, inspection of equipment and functionality of the Emergency Operation Centre and of self-protection equipment and tools for emergency response organization workers.
According to the Law on Civil Protection, the Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of the Interior is the designated national coordinating authority, which directs the activities of the civil protection system; coordinates the organization of emergency prevention and the activities of residents, state and municipal institutions and agencies, and other agencies and economic entities in the field of civil protection; and plans the national preparedness for the implementation of civil protection tasks in the event of an emergency. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the preparation of the National Plan for Protection of the Population in Case of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency (Off-Site Plan) dedicated to cope with nuclear and radiological emergencies. The responsibilities of the main government institutions taking part in preparedness and response to nuclear emergencies (Fire and Rescue Department, RPC, Ministry of Environment, VATESI, Ministry of Health, Ministry of the Interior, State Food and Veterinary Service, etc.) are defined in the National Plan for Protection of the Population in Case of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency.
3. NATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS
3.1. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
3.1.1. Regulatory authority(ies)
VATESI, established in 1991, is an independent state institution exercising state regulation and supervision of nuclear safety, physical security, activities involving nuclear materials and other activities in the area of nuclear energy involving sources of ionizing radiation. VATESI acts in accordance with the Law on Nuclear Energy, Law on Nuclear Safety, other laws and the Statute of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate. VATESI reports to the President and the Government.
The main responsibilities of VATESI are the following:
To exercise the functions of state regulation and supervision of nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear fuel cycle materials and other nuclear materials; accounting for and control of nuclear materials; radiation protection in nuclear facilities; and oversight of the use of sources of ionizing radiation within nuclear facilities.
To draft and approve by the order of the head of VATESI the requirements and rules for nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear fuel cycle materials and other nuclear materials of the defined quantity; accounting for and control of the nuclear materials; and radiation safety in the area of nuclear energy, mandatory to all the state and municipal authorities and to all persons engaged in nuclear energy related activities.
To set requirements for physical security of sources of ionizing radiation used in the area of nuclear energy and supervise their implementation.
To set requirements in the nuclear energy area for obligatory radiation safety training, instruction and evaluation of knowledge of persons responsible for radiation safety, and supervise their implementation.
To set requirements for certification of persons seeking to obtain the right to train persons responsible for radiation safety and perform the certification.
To analyse and assess the documents submitted by applicants for obtaining a licence or a permit as well as the documents submitted by licence holders or permit holders or other persons, to adopt relevant decisions regarding such documents, and to review and evaluate nuclear safety.
To supervise and inspect applicants, licence and permit holders or the persons rendering services, supplying goods or performing work for them or other persons engaged in activities pertaining to nuclear materials and nuclear fuel cycle materials.
To issue or suspend licences and permits, other authorization decisions, revoke suspension of licences and permits, other authorization decisions, or revoke licences and permits, other authorization decisions; to supervise authorized activities.
To cooperate with foreign institutions exercising state regulation and supervision in the sector of nuclear energy, within its competence to participate in activities of international organizations and institutions, committees and groups of the European Union.
Within its competence and in the manner laid down by the legal acts, to prepare and/or submit to the Government the draft laws and legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania on the issues of nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and nuclear fuel cycle materials; accounting for and control of nuclear materials; and radiation safety in carrying out nuclear energy related activities involving sources of ionizing radiation.
To prepare and submit to the Government or its authorized institutions proposals regarding improvements of the system ensuring nuclear safety; physical security of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and other nuclear fuel cycle materials; accounting for and control of nuclear materials; and radiation safety in the area of nuclear energy.
In the event of a nuclear and (or) radiological accident, to provide the interested state and municipal authorities with time critical information about the radiation situation in the nuclear installation, estimated threats of the nuclear and (or) radiological accident and other related information.
To participate in emergency preparedness activities, such as regulation and supervision of on-site emergency preparedness, or notification of international organizations and neighbouring countries in case of a nuclear accident.
In cooperation with the State Security Department, Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of National Defence, to conduct national threat assessment and develop design basis threat for nuclear material and nuclear facilities.
VATESI is empowered to impose the following administrative enforcement measures:
(i) Pursuant to the Law on Public Administration and Order No. 22.3-106, 24 October 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate On the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.1.4-2017 Rules of Procedure for Applying the Enforcement Measures Set by the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate, VATESI is empowered to issue an economic entity, individual stated in the Article 8, para. 1 of the Law on Radiation Protection, radiation protection officer or dosimetry service with a mandatory requirement to eliminate insignificant violations of legal acts.
(ii) Pursuant to the Law on Nuclear Safety VATESI is empowered to impose the following administrative enforcement measures:
Issue a mandatory requirement to licence or permit holders committing them to eliminate detected violations in nuclear safety and physical security, to suspend the work within the time limits set by the Head of VATESI and/or to shut down the nuclear reactor, to decrease its capacity, to discontinue operation of other equipment or activities;
Impose fines on legal entities according to the Article 47, paras 1 and 2 of the Law on Nuclear Safety (known as economic sanctions);
Issue the licence or permit holder with a warning regarding the possible license or permit suspension, to suspend the licence or permit, to revoke the license or permit.
(iii) Pursuant to the Law on Radiation Protection VATESI is empowered to impose the following administrative enforcement measures:
Issue an individual stated in Article 8, para. 1 of the Law on Radiation Protection with a mandatory requirement to eliminate violations of legal acts governing radiation safety and/or physical security of ionizing radiation sources, to issue a warning to suspend activities with ionizing radiation sources, to suspend activities with ionizing radiation sources;
Issue a warning regarding the possible revocation of activity registration, to revoke activity registration;
Issue the licence or temporary permit holder a warning regarding the possible licence or temporary permit suspension, to suspend the licence or temporary permit, to revoke the licence or temporary permit;
Issue person who provides radiation training with a mandatory requirement to eliminate violations of legal acts governing radiation and/or physical protection trainings;
Issue natural person holding radiation protection attestation certificate a warning about possible suspension of radiation protection attestation certificate, to suspend radiation protection attestation certificate, to revoke radiation protection attestation certificate;
Issue nuclear facility dosimetry service or other individuals responsible for measurement and/or evaluation of exposure dose a mandatory requirement to eliminate violations of legal acts governing recognition requirements, to issue a warning about possible suspension of recognition certificate, to suspend validity of recognition certificate, to revoke validity of recognition certificate;
Issue radiation protection expert a warning about possible suspension of validity of radiation protection expert certificate, to suspend validity of radiation protection expert certificate, to revoke validity of radiation protection expert certificate;
Revoke permission to transport radioactive material or validity of standard document to transport radioactive material.
(iv) Pursuant to the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania, VATESI is empowered to impose administrative fines and other administrative sanctions on natural persons.
3.1.2. Licensing process
The Law on Nuclear Energy and the Law on Nuclear Safety, together with the regulations made under the laws, establish the authorization system for activities related to nuclear materials or nuclear fuel cycle materials, as well as for nuclear facilities during the following stages: site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning as well as release from control. The supervision of closed radioactive waste repositories and the acquisition, keeping, use and transportation of nuclear or nuclear fuel cycle materials is also executed according to the laws mentioned above.
Some of the steps of the authorization process are divided into several substeps. Licences, permits and approvals of the documents are used as separate authorization steps and substeps.
The Law on Nuclear Safety establishes the following types of licences and permits issued by VATESI:
Licence for construction of a nuclear facility (or facilities);
Licence for operation of a nuclear facility (or facilities);
Licence for construction and operation of a nuclear facility (or facilities) (an alternative authorization replacing two separate licences for construction and operation);
Licence for decommissioning of a nuclear facility (or facilities);
Licence for supervision of a closed radioactive waste repository (or repositories);
Licence for transportation of nuclear fuel cycle materials, nuclear materials and other fissile materials with the exception of small amounts as described in the Law;
Licence for acquisition, keeping and use of nuclear materials and other fissile materials with the exception of small amounts as prescribed in the Law;
Permit for first carry-in of nuclear fuel to the site of a nuclear power plant, unit or non-power nuclear reactor;
Permit for the first carry-in and testing of the nuclear facility using nuclear and/or nuclear fuel cycle materials (can be issued if a common licence for construction and operation was issued previously);
Permit for first startup of a unit of a nuclear power plant or non-power nuclear reactor;
Permit for industrial operation of the nuclear facility;
Permit for startup of the nuclear reactor after its short term shutdown;
Permit for shipment of radioactive waste generated in the nuclear fuel cycle;
Permit for shipment of spent nuclear fuel.
‘Nuclear facility’, ‘nuclear material’, and ‘spent nuclear fuel’ are defined in the Law on Nuclear Energy. Nuclear facility includes the following:
Nuclear power plants;
Units of nuclear power plants;
Non-power nuclear reactors;
Storage facilities for nuclear materials;
Storage facilities for radioactive waste;
Radioactive waste processing facilities;
Radioactive waste disposal facilities.
‘Nuclear material’ covers plutonium, uranium (natural, enriched with isotopes of uranium-235 or uranium-233 or depleted) and thorium found in the form of metal alloys, chemical compounds or concentrates or in a mixture with other materials; ‘spent nuclear fuel’ covers nuclear fuel that was subjected to exposure in the core of a nuclear reactor and was permanently removed from it. Spent nuclear fuel may be reprocessed with the aim of reusing it or managed as radioactive waste and placed in a waste disposal facility.
It also should be mentioned that some activities (hold points) during various stages in the lifetime of a nuclear facility require separate authorizations that are supported by a safety review and assessment:
During the stage of site evaluation of a nuclear facility, VATESI shall review and assess the site evaluation report. In order for the site evaluation report of a nuclear power plant to be approved, positive conclusions with respect to it shall be presented by the following institutions: the Ministry of Health, the Civil Aviation Administration, the Lithuanian Geology Service, the Lithuanian Hydro Meteorological Service and the Fire Prevention and Rescue Department.
Before the design activities start, the technical specifications for the design have to be approved by VATESI.
The design of a nuclear facility has to be performed and assessed according to the requirements established by the competent institutions, including VATESI, the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health, Ministry of the Interior and other institutions involved, according to the Law on Construction, the Law on Nuclear Energy and the regulations made under the laws.
Commissioning can be performed according to a commissioning programme. VATESI’s agreement on the commissioning programme is necessary before commissioning starts.
The legislation obligates the licence holder to conduct a periodic safety analysis. VATESI’s agreement on the periodic safety analysis report is necessary. The Law on Nuclear Safety defines cases when the safety analysis report must be updated, with agreement from VATESI obtained.
VATESI’s agreement is necessary on documentation of modifications and testing that was not foreseen in the design, or documentation of other divergences from a nuclear facility design, prior to the start of modifications.
VATESI’s agreement is necessary on physical security plans and plans for radioactive discharges into the environment.
The Law on Nuclear Safety together with the Regulations on the Issuance of Licences and Permits Necessary to Engage in Nuclear Energy Activities, approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, and the Rules on Import, Export, Transit and Transport of Radioactive Material, Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, approved by a decree of the Minister of Health and head of VATESI, regulate the issuance, amendment and suspension of licences and permits listed in the Law on Nuclear Safety; the maintenance of the list of documents which have to be submitted for issuance of every type of licence and permit or amendment of a licence or permit; and instructions for providing documents which must be provided in order to revoke or suspend a licence or permit. Detailed requirements for safety documents are determined in the respective nuclear safety requirements and rules issued by VATESI. Some requirements for the content of the documents that the applicant is required to provide for the issuance or amendment of an appropriate licence or permit are established by the aforementioned regulation as well.
According to the procedure set in the legislation, the applicant has to submit an application to VATESI to obtain a licence or permit or its amendment.
Together with the application to issue a licence or permit, a schedule of submission of application documents has to be prepared and agreed with VATESI. The Law on Nuclear Safety sets requirements and conditions for acceptance of an application or of a schedule of application documents, as well as time limits for the acceptance of an application and agreement on a schedule.
The Law on Nuclear Safety also determines conditions for refusal of the application for a licence or permit.
VATESI makes decisions on authorizations according to its competence after review and assessment of safety submittals that are required by legal acts. According to VATESI’s internal management system Procedure Document on Review and Assessment of Safety Justifying Documents and Procedure Document for Licensing, specialists of VATESI have to prepare review and assessment reports as well as safety evaluation reports in support of VATESI decisions on the issuance of authorization. According to recent practice, safety evaluation reports are usually available to applicants (licence holders) and their summaries are available to the public on the VATESI web site. The list of the documents under which a licence or permit is issued is also prepared.
The Law on Nuclear Safety sets requirements and conditions and time limits for issuance of licences and permits. Some additional conditions (e.g. necessary authorizations by other national regulatory bodies) are also established by the Law on Nuclear Safety as well as the Law on Nuclear Energy. A licence or permit has to be issued for an unlimited period of time until official decision of the regulatory body in this regard (with an exception for permits to transport radioactive materials or spent nuclear fuel). The permits to transport radioactive materials or spent nuclear fuel are issued for a 3 year period.
The Law on Nuclear Safety also determines the conditions for making decisions not to issue a licence or permit specifying the reasons based on provisions of the law.
Pursuant to the Law on Nuclear Safety, VATESI issues certificates for approval of package design and shipment of radioactive material under conditions specified in the Law on Nuclear Safety.
Following the provisions of the Law on Radiation Protection, VATESI registers activities and issues licences and permits for nuclear energy area activities involving sources of ionizing radiation, which mainly include either a licence or a temporary permit to carry out activities involving ionizing radiation at a nuclear facility and a licence or a temporary permit to store or maintain sources of ionizing radiation at a nuclear facility. VATESI also issues certificates to natural persons seeking to obtain the right to train persons responsible for radiation safety or to perform activities as radiation protection experts.
3.2. MAIN NATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN NUCLEAR POWER
Main National Laws
Law on Nuclear Energy;
Law on Nuclear Safety;
Law on the Management of Radioactive Waste;
Law on Radiation Protection;
Law on Environmental Protection;
Law on Environmental Monitoring;
Law on Waste Management;
Law on Civil Protection;
Law on Energy;
Law on Electricity;
Law on Metrology;
Law on Environmental Impact Assessment of the Proposed Economic Activity;
Law on Charges;
Law on Construction;
Law on Control of Strategic Goods;
Law on Health System;
Law on Decommissioning of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant;
Law on Nuclear Power Plant;
Law on the State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning Fund;
Law on Water;
Law on Depths of Land;
Law on Safety and Health of Employees;
Law on Fire Safety;
Law on Additional Employment and Social Guarantees for the Employees of the State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant;
Law on Granting the Concession and Assuming the Essential Property Obligations of the Republic of Lithuania in the Visaginas NPP Project;
Law on the Enforcement of the Application of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963 and the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention of 21 September 1988;
Law on Corporate Income Tax;
Law on State and Official Secrets;
Law on Klaipeda Sea Port.
Main Regulations on Nuclear Power
Resolution No. 1406, 21 November 2012, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of the Statute on the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate;
Resolution No. 722, 20 June 2012, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of the Regulations on the Issue of Licences and Permits Necessary to Engage in Nuclear Energy Activities;
Resolution No. 918, 12 September 2018, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the Implementation of the Law on Radiation Protection of the Republic of Lithuania;
Order No. 22.3-58, 15 June 2009, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.1.1-2014, Rules of Procedure for Drafting of Nuclear Safety Requirements and Nuclear Safety Rules;
Order No. 22.3-192, 22 August 2018, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on Consulting Economic Entities in State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate;
Order No. 22.3-82, 25 August 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.1.3-2016, Inspections Conducted by the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate;
Order No. 22.3-106, 24 October 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.1.4-2017, Rules of Procedure for Applying the Enforcement Measures Set by the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate.
Site Selection and Approval
Resolution No. 83, 25 January 2012, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of Rules of Procedure of the Assessment of the Nuclear Facilities’ Site Evaluation Report;
Order No. 22.3-58, 20 July 2010, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-2.1.3-2010, General Requirements on Site Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants.
Radiation Protection, Including Protection of Workers, Public and Environment
Order No. 663, 21 December 2001, approved by the Minister of Health on the approval of Hygiene Standard HN 73:2018, Basic Standard of Radiation Protection;
Order No. 389, 17 July 2001, approved by the Minister of Health on the approval of Hygiene Standard HN 112:2019, Requirements for Monitoring of Internal Exposure (last amended in 2019);
Order No. V-928, 10 October 2012, approved by the Minister of Health on the approval of Hygiene Standard HN 52:2012, Radiation Protection in Industrial Radiography;
Order No. V-678, 1 September 2005, approved by the Minister of Health on the approval of Hygiene Standard HN 88:2005, Radiation Safety of the Open Ionizing Radiation Sources of Non-medical Purpose;
Order No. 22.3-89, 27 September 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.9.1-2017, Standards of Release of Radionuclides from Nuclear Installations and Requirements for the Plan on Release of Radionuclides;
Order No. 22.3-90, 27 September 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.9.2-2018, Derivation and Use of Clearance Levels of Radionuclides for Materials and Waste Generated during Activities in the Area of Nuclear Energy;
Order No. 22.3-95, 6 October 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.9.3-2016, Radiation Protection at Nuclear Facilities;
Order No. 22.3-73, 29 April 2016, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.9.4-2019, On Procedure of Obligatory Radiation Protection Training, Examination, Briefing of Radiation Workers and Radiation Protection Officers Involved in Activities with Sources of Ionizing Radiation in the Nuclear Energy Area and of Certification of Natural Persons Seeking to Obtain the Right to Teach Radiation Protection.
Safety of Nuclear Installations
Order No. 22.3-169, 25 July 2018, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.8.4-2018, Ageing management of structures, systems and components important to safety of nuclear facility;
Order No. 22.3-72, 30 December 2005, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Requirements for Analysis of Explosion and Aircraft Crash Impact for Nuclear Facilities;
Order No. 22.3-33, 30 June 2006, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Requirements for Analysis of Seismic Impact for Nuclear Facilities;
Order No. 22.3-148, 4 July 2019, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.4.4-2019, Use of Operating Experience in the Field of Nuclear Energy;
Order No. 22.3-16, 5 February 2010, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-2.1.2-2010, General Requirements on the Assurance of Safety of Nuclear Power Plants with RBMK-1500 Type Reactors;
Order No. 56, 21 December 2002, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Safety Requirements for Accident Localization Systems;
Order No. 22.3-91, 26 November 2010, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Rules BST-2.1.1-2010, Design, Construction and Operation of Electric Power Supply Systems;
Order No. 22.3-118, 23 November 2009, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-2.1.1-2009, Requirements for Deterministic Safety Analysis of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant;
Order No. 22.3-117, 25 November 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-2.1.4-2011, Preparation and Use of the Nuclear Power Plant’s Safety Analysis Report;
Order No. 22.3-57, 10 April 2014, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.7.1-2014, Fire Safety of Safety Related Structures, Systems and Components;
Order No. 22.3-56, 21 June 2010, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.4.1-2016, Management System;
Order No. 22.3-99, 7 October 2011, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.8.2-2015, Categories of Modifications of Nuclear Facility and Procedure for Performing the Modifications;
Order No. 22.3-22, 29 January 2014, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.4.2-2014, Management of Construction of a Nuclear Facility;
Order No. 22.3-295, 4 December 2018, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.8.5-2018, Commissioning of Nuclear Facility;
Order No. 22.3-160, 20 September 2017, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.4.3-2017, Managing Human Resources in the Field of Nuclear Power;
Order No. 22.3-222, 24 November 2017, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.8.3-2017, Technical Specification of a Nuclear Facility;
Order No. 22.3-87, 27 March 2018, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-2.1.6-2018, Design of a Nuclear Power Plant;
Order No. 22.3-7, 13 January 2020, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.8.8-2020, Lifting Equipment and its Devices Important to Safety of Nuclear Facility;
Order No. 22.3-15, 17 January 2020, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the Approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.8.7-2020, Safety of Activities with Nuclear Materials Regulated by the License of State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate.
Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Including Storage and Disposal
Resolution No. 1427, 23 December 2015, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of a Development Programme on Radioactive Waste Management;
Resolution No. 1872, 3 December 2002, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of the Rules of Procedure for Submission of Data on Activities Involving Radioactive Waste Disposal to the European Commission;
Order No. 22.3-188, 30 November 2016, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-3.2.2-2016, Radioactive Waste Repositories;
Order No. 22.3-103, 27 May 2015, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-3.2.1-2015, Radioactive Waste Acceptance Criteria for a Near Surface Repository;
Order No. 22.3-59, 21 July 2010, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-3.1.1-2016, Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel in a Storage Facility of the Dry Type;
Order No. 22.3-120, 31 December 2010, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-3.1.2-2017, Pre-disposal Management of Radioactive Waste at Nuclear Facilities.
Decommissioning, Including Funding and Institutional Control
Resolution No. 117, 2 February 2005, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of a Decommissioning Programme of First and Second Units of State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant;
Resolution No. 1491, 25 November 2004, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of the Date of Shutdown of the First Unit of State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant;
Resolution No. 974, 13 October 1994, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of the Date of Shutdown of the Second Unit of State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant;
Order No. 22.3-216, 30 November 2015, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.5.1-2019, Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities;
Order No. 22.3-206, 20 December 2016, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Rules BST-1.5.1-2016, The Evaluation of Compliance with Free Release Criteria of Buildings and Site of Nuclear Facilities.
Resolution No. 99, 18 January 2012, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of the National Plan for Protection of the Population in Case of a Nuclear and Radiological Accident (as amended in 2018);
Order No. D1-136/22.3-15, 10 February 2012, approved by the Minister of Environment of the Republic of Lithuania and Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Rules of Procedure on the Exchange of Information in Case of Extreme Radiological Situations;
Order No. 22.3-18, 21 January 2020, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.3.1-2020, Enforcement of Emergency Preparedness in Nuclear Installations.
Transport of Radioactive Material
Order No. V-1271/22.3-139, 24 December 2008, approved by the Minister of Health and the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Rules of Radioactive Material, Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel Import, Export, Transportation in Transit and inside the Republic of Lithuania;
Order No. 22.3-133, 31 July 2017, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-4.1.1-2017, Rules on the Issuance of Certificates for Transport of Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Nuclear and Fissionable Materials;
Order No. 22.3-169, 19 July 2019, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-4.1.2-2019, Requirements for Documents Accompanying Application for Issuance of License to Transport Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Nuclear and Fissile Materials.
Nuclear Security, Safeguards, Import and Export Controls of Nuclear Material and Items
Resolution No. 127, 2 February 2012, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of Rules of Procedure of the Development and Review of the Design Basis Threat and Submission of Information to the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (as amended in 2017);
Resolution No. 670, 3 July 2019, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on approval of Rules of Procedure for Ensuring Physical Security of the Nuclear Facility, Nuclear Facility Sites, Nuclear and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Materials;
Resolution No, 1414, 27 December 2018, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of Rules for Procedure for the Vetting, Regular Monitoring and Reporting of the Information regarding persons in the nuclear energy field;
Resolution No. 932, 22 July 2004, of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of Rules of the Licensing Rules for Export, Import, Transit, Brokering and Intra-EU Transfer of Strategic Goods, the Rules on the Implementation of Control of Strategic Goods and the Rules on the Certification of Recipient Undertakings Manufacturing Military Equipment (as amended in 2020);
Order No. 22.3-85, 30 May 2014, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.2.1-2014, Rules of Procedure of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control, and Provision of Information about Research and Development Activities, and repeal of some orders approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (as amended in 2019);
Order No. 22.3-104, 4 September 2012, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Rules BST-1.6.1-2012, Preparation of the Security Plan;
Order No. 22.3-37, 4 April 2012, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.6.1-2019, Physical Security of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Material (as amended in 2019);
Order No. 22.3-109, 10 June 2016, approved by the Head of the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate on the approval of Nuclear Safety Requirements BSR-1.6.2-2016, Physical Security of Sources of Ionizing Radiation used in Activities in the Area of Nuclear Energy Involving Sources of Ionizing Radiation.
APPENDIX 1. INTERNATIONAL, MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
Ratified or Accessed
Convention on Nuclear Safety, entered into force on 24 October 1996;
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, entered into force on 14 June 2004;
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, 1986, entered into force on 22 October 2000;
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (ESPOO), 1991, entered into force on 11 April 2001;
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 1992, entered into force on 27 July 2000;
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005, entered into force on 19 August 2007;
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 1968, entered into force on 23 September 1991;
European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR) 2003, entered into force on 1 January 2003;
Memorandum of Understanding (Version Ronne, 25 to 27 August 1998) for the Transport of Dangerous Goods on Ro-Ro Ships in Accordance with the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code), the Requirements of the Regulations Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (RID) and the European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), 1998, entered into force on 20 June 2002;
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1963, entered into force on 15 November 1992;
Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1979, entered into force on 6 January 1994;
8 July 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, entered into force on 8 May 2016;
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 1986, entered into force on 17 December 1994;
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 1998, entered into force on 28 April 2002;
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, 1988, entered into force on 20 December 1993.
Signed, Not Ratified
ZANGGER Committee — Non-Member;
Membership in Nuclear Suppliers Group — from 2004;
Acceptance of NUSS Codes — Accepted.
Cooperation Agreements with the IAEA in the area of Nuclear Power
Membership in the IAEA — 18 November 1993;
NPT related agreement, INFCIRC/413, entered into force on 15 October 1992 (suspended);
Improved procedures for designation of safeguards inspectors (accepted);
Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (78/164/Euratom), 1978, entered into force on 21 April 2007;
Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (notified under document number COM(1998) 314) (78/164/Euratom), 1998, entered into force on 1 January 2008;
Supplementary Agreement on Provision of Technical Assistance by the IAEA, entered into force on 22 February 1995;
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA, 1959, entered into force on 28 February 2001.
Bilateral Agreements with other Countries or Organizations Signed/Ratified by the Country in the Field of Nuclear Power
Agreement for the Exchange of Information and Cooperation on Nuclear and Radiological Safety between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Denmark, entered into force on 16 March 1993;
Agreement on Early Notification of Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Poland, entered into force on 18 December 1996;
Agreement on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents and on the Exchange of Information on Nuclear Facilities between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, entered into force on 14 January 1998;
Target Agreement between the German and Lithuanian Party on Methodology Transfer for the Preparation of NPP Decommissioning for Leading Personnel of the Ignalina NPP and for Representatives of Lithuanian Authorities, entered into force on 21 February 2002;
Agreement on Early Notification of Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Latvia, entered into force on 3 October 2003;
Accession Agreement to the ESARDA Agreement No. 22613-2004-12 SONEN ISP BE, signed on 17 October 2005;
Agreement on Early Notification of Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies between the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate of the Republic of Lithuania and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority of the Kingdom of Sweden, signed on 28 December 2008;
Arrangement between the Lithuanian State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the Exchange of Technical Information and Cooperation in Nuclear Safety Matters, signed on 14 September 2015;
Arrangement between the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine and the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate of the Republic of Lithuania for the Exchange of Information and Cooperation in Matters of Regulation of Usage of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes, signed on 3 December 2010;
Memorandum for Information Exchange between the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate of the Republic of Lithuania and the Nuclear Regulation Authority of Japan, entered into force on 31 December 2014;
Joint Action Plan between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on Combating Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials and Related Technology, signed on 3 April 2013;
ENSRA Additional Agreement for Membership, signed on 8 October 2013;
Bilateral agreement with Belgoprocess (Belgium) on radioactive waste management experience exchange for 2016–2017;
EURAD project (European Joint Programme (EJP) on Radioactive Waste Management) approved by EC in February 2019;
Agreement for the Exchange of Scientific and Technical Information on Nuclear Installation Decommissioning Projects between State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant and OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, signed on 12 February 2020;
Bilateral interinstitutional agreement between the Lithuanian State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) and the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Republic of Belarus for early notification about emergencies in nuclear facilities and for exchange of nuclear safety important information, signed on 25 May 2020.
APPENDIX 2. MAIN ORGANIZATIONS, INSTITUTIONS AND COMPANIES INVOLVED IN NUCLEAR POWER RELATED ACTIVITIES
|President of the Republic of Lithuania |
|Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania |
|Government of the Republic of Lithuania |
|State Security Department |
|Ministry of Energy |
|Ministry of Economy and Innovation|
|Ministry of Environment |
|Environmental Protection Agency |
|Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
|Ministry of Health |
|Radiation Protection Centre (RPC) |
|The Ministry of the Interior |
|Ministry of National Defence |
|State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) |
|State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant |
|UAB „Ignitis grupe“|
|Lithuanian Energy Institute |
|Kaunas University of Technology |
|Vilnius Gediminas Technical University |
|Centre for Physical Sciences|